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Freedom, Choice, and Contracts
Hanoch Dagan* & Michael Heller**
In “The Choice Theory of Contracts,” we explain contractual freedom
and celebrate the plurality of contract types. Here, we reply to critics
by refining choice theory and showing how it fits and shapes what
we term the “Contract Canon”.
I. Freedom. (1) Charles Fried challenges our account of Kantian
autonomy, but his views, we show, largely converge with choice
theory. (2) Nathan Oman argues for a commerce-enhancing account
of autonomy. We counter that he arbitrarily slights noncommercial
spheres central to human interaction. (3) Yitzhak Benbaji suggests
that choice theory’s commitment to autonomy is overly perfectionist.
Happily, in response to Benbaji, we can cite with approval Charles
Fried’s point that contract types are “enabling our liberties.”
II. Choice. (4) Aditi Bagchi criticizes our inattention to impediments
to choice. We show how choice theory’s commitments to both multiplicity
and relational justice ameliorate these impediments. (5) Gregory Klass
explores parol evidence to highlight the mechanisms of choice. We
substantially concur with his position, and show how such mechanisms
can ensure voluntariness, an essential element of choice. (6) Oren
Bar-Gill and Clayton Gillette question the institutional capacity of
existing legal actors to implement choice theory. Working from the
example of cohabitation, we offer a somewhat more optimistic view.
III. Contracts. (7) Peter Benson contends our focus on the rational
slights the reasonable. Although we did not use this Rawlsian
vocabulary, choice theory complies with its strictures — more so
than transfer theory. (8) Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz claim
provocatively that contract theory must: capitulate before pluralism (as
they endorse); leverage it; or fall victim to a so-called “embracing”
*
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approach (their charge against us). We reject the charge that choice
theory is foundationally value-pluralist. Instead, we cabin pluralism
and put it to work. (9) The Contract Canon starts on the next big step
for choice theory by explaining existing doctrine (rebutting Benson
on lack of fit) and helping adjudicate contract practice (countering
Markovits and Schwartz on the vices of our pluralism).
Each Article in this Issue advances the field; each prompts us to
refine choice theory — all steps, we hope, toward a more just and
justified law of contract.

Introduction
In The Choice Theory of Contracts,1 we advance a liberal approach to contract
that celebrates the plurality of contract types and justifies contractual freedom.
Here, we reply to critics.
First, in Choice Theory, we reject the universalizing tendency of the
Willistonian project and instead highlight contract’s multiplicity. We shift
the emphasis from “general” contract law to (or rather, back to) particular
contract types. Contract types — including the residual type of “freestanding
contracting” — are the proper categories for law design. We are not the first
to warn against the flattening effects of contract monism and the unprincipled
multiplicity of the common law (and European civil law) that Williston hoped
to systematize. But, unlike other critiques, choice theory offers a principled
account of contract’s multiplicity. The principle that grounds contract law is
autonomy.
Our second departure concerns the meaning and role of freedom in contract.
Liberal theories of contract typically attempt to distill an autonomy-based
account purged of any teleological foundation. Our account is diametrically
opposed: choice theory embraces autonomy’s role as the telos of contract.
Contract, we argue, is a valuable convention — indeed, a convention that
any liberal polity must enact — because, and to the extent that, it proactively
enhances individual autonomy, defined as people’s self-determination or selfauthorship — that is, our right to write and re-write the story of our lives.
A key takeaway of choice theory lies at the juncture of types and freedom.
Our teleological theory reveals contract to be essentially a power-conferring
institution, not a duty-imposing one. Contract law offers people a new power:
the ability to make their lives meaningfully their own by legitimately enlisting
others to their most important projects. This insight implies that one of the
1

Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, The Choice Theory of Contracts (2017).
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most fundamental contributions contract can, does, and should make to liberal
societies is to ensure an adequate range of meaningfully-available, normativelyattractive contract types in each important sphere of human interaction.
This Issue offers penetrating critiques of choice theory. We are indebted
to Charles Fried, Nathan Oman, Yitzhak Benbaji, Aditi Bagchi, Gregory
Klass, Oren Bar-Gill, Clayton Gillette, Peter Benson, Daniel Markovits, and
Alan Schwartz for their thoughtful and generous discussions.2 Each of their
Articles advances the field; and in turn, each helps us refine and extend choice
theory — a step, we hope, toward a more just and justified law of contract.
As this Article can neither address all their points, nor do justice to all their
subtleties, we have confined our comments to the three main themes of this
Issue: Freedom, Choice, and Contracts.
Part I refines the conception of freedom on which choice theory relies. It
highlights the distance between autonomy and independence, vindicating the
loyalty of our autonomy-based theory to the liberal injunction of toleration,
and explaining how law can — and should — be autonomy-enhancing without
being perfectionist. In Part II, we turn to choice, contending that multiplicity
can be (and often is) conducive to justice, and studying how close attention
to contract law’s mechanisms of choice, as well as to the political economy
surrounding law’s production, can (and should) guide choice theory. Finally, in
Part III, we focus on contract law, arguing that the commitment of reciprocal
respect to self-determination stands at the core of the liberal idea of contract,
moving contract law to a form of pluralism that is principled, structured, and
informed.
Since publishing Choice Theory, we have engaged with dozens of reviews
and responses,3 including the eight in this Issue. All of this rigorous debate
confirms for us one core point: contract’s ultimate value must be autonomy,
2

3

See Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: Lessons Learned, 20 Theoretical
Inquiries L. 367 (2019); Nathan B. Oman, Contract Law and the Liberalism of
Fear, 20 Theoretical Inquiries L. 381 (2019); Yitzhak Benbaji, Contract Law in
a Just Society, 20 Theoretical Inquiries L. 411 (2019); Aditi Bagchi, Voluntary
Obligation and Contract, 20 Theoretical Inquiries L. 433 (2019); Gregory Klass,
Parol Evidence Rules and the Mechanics of Choice, 20 Theoretical Inquiries
L. 457 (2019); Oren Bar-Gill & Clayton P. Gillette, On the Optimal Number of
Contract Types, 20 Theoretical Inquiries L. 487 (2019); Peter Benson, Unity
and Multiplicity in Contract Law: From General Principles to Transaction-Types,
20 Theoretical Inquiries L. 537 (2019); Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz,
Plural Values in Contract Law: Theory and Implementation, 20 Theoretical
Inquiries L. 571 (2019).
For a sample, see Volume 38 of Law & Philosophy (forthcoming 2019) (issue
on Choice Theory) and Volume 18 of Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies
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properly understood. We therefore conclude this Article by showing how
our critics have helped us to advance choice theory.4 To do this, we highlight
the theory’s guiding principles — proactive facilitation, regard for future
selves, and relational justice — and sketch how they explain what we term
the “Contract Canon”. Choice theory, thus refined, vindicates the interpretive
(and not only normative) power of our autonomy-based theory of contracts.

I. Freedom: Autonomy, Nothing Less
Charles Fried, Nathan Oman, and Yitzhak Benbaji take issue with the liberal
foundations of choice theory. Fried argues that choice theory mistakenly
disavows the Kantian approach to contracts. Oman takes a diametrically opposite
view: he opposes choice theory’s reliance on autonomy as unacceptable to
religious believers, and suggests that the only legitimate telos of contract is to
serve commerce. Echoing Oman’s critique of neutrality, Benbaji claims that
choice theory relies on an overly-robust account of autonomy, and offers a
Rawlsian alternative, one not inflicted with the difficulties of what he views
as choice theory’s excessive perfectionism.
A. Autonomy — Not Independence
We begin with Fried, due to his canonical status as the founding father of
modern liberal theories of contract. Surprisingly to some, perhaps, our positions
largely converge with his.
At first, Fried rejects the adjective “teleological” (or “instrumental”) and
he refuses to renounce the Kantian premise of his promise theory.5 But it
is, we think, no coincidence that he ultimately embraces choice theory and
graciously describes it as an “account of contract as the facilitating framework
of human collaboration under our shared master norm of autonomy [that] is
richer, more useful, and truer than my own account in Contract as Promise.”6

4

5
6

(forthcoming 2019) (issue on Choice Theory). The papers in both volumes are
mostly available on SSRN.com.
We refine choice theory in Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, Autonomy for
Contract, Refined, 38 L. & Phil. (forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Dagan &
Heller, Autonomy, Refined]; Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, Why Autonomy
Must Be Contract’s Ultimate Value, 18 Jerusalem Rev. Legal Stud. (forthcoming
2019) [hereinafter Dagan & Heller, Ultimate Value]. Both papers are available
on SSRN.com.
Fried, supra note 2, at 372-73.
Id., at 379.
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Explaining why Fried is able to subscribe to choice theory helps clarify both
what we claim and what we do not.
Consider first our critique of modern Kantian approaches to contract. These
are a genus of the “transfer theory” we detail in Chapter 3 of Choice Theory,
according to which a promise makes the promisee the sole and despotic
owner of the jointly-created right (however qualified it may be) vis-à-vis the
promisor. The ambition of transfer theory, as we explain there, is to show
why breach of contract is tantamount to conversion, so that the enforcement
of wholly-executory contracts is justified, even absent detrimental reliance by
the promisee, although the only interpersonal obligation law can justifiably
enforce is (in this view) solely negative, namely: to respect each other’s
independence. But we argue that transfer theory fails, because it unnecessarily
assumes an unqualified right to the promisor’s performance and because it
is insufficiently attuned to the implications of contract’s nature as a powerconferring institution.
There is no need for us to reiterate or further defend this critique here
(we do so elsewhere, in response to Arthur Ripstein’s review of our book).7
Why not? It turns out Fried interprets Kant’s view on contracts in a manner
consistent with choice theory.8 His restatement of promise theory happily
(albeit implicitly) joins much of our critique of transfer theory.
We criticized transfer theory to show that reciprocal respect to independence
cannot plausibly justify recruitment of the coercive power of the state for
enforcing (wholly-executory) contracts. But law, we further argued, is
nonetheless justified in enforcing contracts, thanks to contract’s important
contribution to people’s self-authorship. As an essentially power-conferring
legal device, contract allows people to recruit others legitimately to their
goals. The word “legitimately” is key. Contract is a convention that offers
this service of autonomy-enhancement, but it can only work if its invocation
implies that the parties submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the convention
it entrenches in the law. In a liberal polity, we claimed, people are justifiably
expected to pay this (modest) price for the benefit of others, because our
interpersonal relationships are governed by a reciprocal duty to respect each
other’s right of self-determination (or self-authorship).9
7
8
9

See Dagan & Heller, Autonomy, Refined, supra note 4. That piece thus also addresses
Peter Benson’s claim that a transfer conception of contract is “theoretically
indispensable.” Benson, supra note 2, at 539.
The question of whether it is Fried who misstates Kant’s position on contracts
or Ripstein who mischaracterizes Kant’s theory is not for us to resolve.
The text implicitly responds to Yitzhak Benbaji’s claim that “autonomy as
self-determination does not justify the basic distinction between unenforceable
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On its face, such a proposition regarding this reciprocal duty might seem
to aggravate, rather than relieve, the legitimacy challenge, because it openly
admits that enforcing contracts even where nonperformance generates no harm
is tantamount to prescribing an affirmative duty to assist others in pursuing
self-determination. This proposition is indeed devastating to the (Kantian)
view of private law as a stronghold of reciprocal respect for interpersonal
independence.10 But this view, we insisted, is wrong.
Independence is an intrinsic value, not an instrumental value and not, we
argued, our ultimate value. Rather, it is a constitutive part — an essential
ingredient — of the ultimate value of self-determination. This is why liberals
such as H.L.A. Hart are correct in insisting that not every infringement of
independence ignores “the moral importance of the division of humanity
into separate individuals and threatens the proper inviolability of persons.”
Therefore, with Hart, liberals recognize the significance of the “unexciting but
indispensable chore” of distinguishing “between the gravity of the different
restrictions on different specific liberties and their importance for the conduct
of a meaningful life.”11
Fried’s contribution to this Issue largely reaffirms these claims, in which
the legitimacy of contract enforcement depends on a modest affirmative
interpersonal duty. Fried explains that promise theory is preoccupied not only
with the exercise of our freedom, but also with its enlargement.12 He thus claims
that we have “a duty of virtue”13 to enlarge each other’s freedom, which, in its
turn, is the premise of “the rightness, the justice, of state compulsion in certain
circumstances to keep faith with the promise, now called a contract.”14 These
propositions are largely congruent with those set out in Choice Theory. The
only (important) difference between Fried’s position and ours arises because
we renounce the (Kantian) presupposition that any affirmative duty is a duty

10
11
12
13
14

informal promises and enforceable formal contracts.” Benbaji, supra note
2, at 413. Indeed, appreciating the autonomy-based justification for contract
enforcement as a form of (quite minimal) affirmative interpersonal duty, which
is necessary for other people’s ability to resort to contract’s autonomy-enhancing
potential, implies that, where the law is unnecessary for this or where resort
to the law might even be counter-productive, forcible enforcement should not
be available. Cf. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An
Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 Yale L.J. 1261 (1980).
See generally Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political
Theory (2009).
H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 828, 834-35 (1979).
Fried, supra note 2, at 372.
Id., at 370.
Id.
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of virtue.15 Therefore, we conceptualize this obligation in straightforward legal
terms: it is a simple entailment of people’s most fundamental interpersonal
duty of reciprocal respect to self-determination.
Fried’s contribution also helps clarify the limited sense in which our
account is teleological. Nothing in our view embraces a teleological approach
to morality. We tried to be precise on this point in the book. Perhaps we should
state it more forcefully: choice theory insists that contract should be analyzed
in terms of its autonomy-enhancing telos — not that this is the proper way to
analyze morality. With Fried, we treat individual autonomy as an end, rather
than a means; and, like Fried, we celebrate contract’s contribution to this end.
Choice theory’s claim, in Fried’s terms, is that the “second-order” promises
that constitute the “convention or practice” of promise cannot be simply
assumed (as they are under transfer theory). Rather — and we concur in this
view — they should be prescribed, so that they indeed enlarge our freedom.
This lesson will be our starting point for Part III of this Article.
B. Autonomy and Liberal Toleration
Nathan Oman fiercely objects to this “grandiose vision of liberalism that
places at its center a strong vision of autonomous choosing individuals.”16
Autonomy, he argues, cannot plausibly justify contract once “alternative
moral stances, such as those informed by monotheistic religions, are seriously
considered.”17 The reason is that, for most religious believers, “there are moral
principles whose validity does not rest on their contribution to the quality of
human life.”18 Indeed, Oman asserts that, for many, “morality consists not in
the affirmation of the self but rather in forgetfulness of the self,”19 and selfauthorship is a sheer “myth,” since by the time we reach adulthood we are
“already infected by a life-time of unchosen commitments and influences.”20
Because choice theory rests on “highly contestable moral premises that are
rejected by many reasonable citizens,” it cannot “generate either practical or
theoretical legitimacy,”21 and should thus be rejected.

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

See Dagan & Heller, Autonomy, Refined, supra note 4.
Oman, supra note 2, at 409.
Id., at 384.
Id., at 392.
Id., at 393.
Id., at 395.
Id., at 391.
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Instead of autonomy, contract’s legitimacy relies, in Oman’s view, on
“more modest and thus more widely acceptable premises,”22 namely, its role
as “a midwife to commerce.”23 Contract law is legitimate, in this account,
because it is “a mechanism for enhancing well-functioning markets”24 that,
in turn, “mediate the peaceful coexistence of those with incommensurable
moral commitments.”25 Promoting autonomy may still be important, though
not as “a primary normative ideal,” but rather as an instrumental value that
helps foster this “modus vivendi vision of liberalism,” in which “[m]arket
exchange provides an institutional framework for cooperation among those
with incommensurable worldviews.”26 This means that, pace our critique,
“Williston got it right” in perceiving contract law as “a framework of relatively
abstract rules that have little if any substantive content,” and in presenting
“the commercial contract [as] the core case of contract law.”27
Oman raises important concerns. But his critique is exaggerated; and,
insofar as it is not, must still be rejected.28 We begin by refining his concern.
Oman does not dispute our claim that “our approach seems to score quite high
on the neutrality test” insofar as it refers to “concrete neutrality,”29 but argues
that it fails the test of “neutrality of grounds,” given that many people do not
accept the prescriptions of autonomy. This failure, he seems to suggest, is
troublesome, because it implies disrespect for alternative, reasonable moral
stances that discount the possibility or the value of individual self-authorship.30
Id.
Id., at 410.
Id., at 407.
Id., at 384.
Id., at 403.
Id., at 405.
Moreover, the alternative justificatory premise Oman proposes is, at best,
question-begging. The market, which for Oman is contract’s master, is not
self-defining — far from it: its design necessarily reflects value choices. See,
e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Why Markets? Welfare, Autonomy, and the Just Society,
117 Mich. L. Rev. 1289 (2019).
29 Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 88-89.
30 It is possible to read Oman’s objections in a broader way, as raising neutrality
concerns regarding the use of self-authorship as the polity’s ultimate value.
Exploring these critiques of perfectionist liberalism (or rather the very thin version
of it we endorse) or the sustainability of the alternative position — political
liberalism — advocated by the critics, surely exceeds the scope of the present
inquiry. For a persuasive critique, see David Enoch, Against Public Reason,
1 Oxford Stud. Pol. 112 (2015). For our purposes, it suffices to note that the
most significant critique of perfectionist liberalism as a form of disrespectful
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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Religious believers certainly deserve equal concern and respect, so resorting
to justifications that undermine such respect is, at least a priori, troublesome.
But it is hard to see how treating self-authorship as contract’s telos can be
offensive in this way. One reason for this is that, while people who identify
as religious believers in the ways Oman typifies may not subscribe to the
ideal of self-authorship, the ideal cannot be as alien to them as he postulates.
As Leslie Green explains, even people who insist that one must follow one’s
destined path cannot fully dismiss self-authorship, because they must recognize
the significance of self-determination, if not “in order to choose one’s path
in life, then in order to discover it.”31
Furthermore, Oman’s critique disregards the nature of contract as a voluntary
undertaking and of contract law as a power-conferring body of law. Let us
assume, with Oman, that religious believers have no difficulty in recruiting
contract law to facilitate commerce, but object to its use in facilitating voluntary
undertakings in other spheres of interpersonal interaction consistent with
interpreting, developing, and reforming contract law so it better serves selfauthorship. When people object to expanding contract’s empowering potential
to spheres such as work, housing, or intimacy, they do not imply there should
be no interpersonal interactions in these spheres, of course. Rather, they signal
the acceptability — to them — of the currently-dominant forms of such
interactions (say, traditional marriage) and resist the notion that law should
also facilitate other forms.
The crucial point here is that making contract law more autonomy-enhancing
does not affect objectors’ ability to pursue their conception of the good.
Objectors need not invoke or use these additional contract types and can
limit their interpersonal interactions in these noncommercial spheres to the
currently dominant forms. This means that, insofar as religious believers are
offended by the notion that contract law should be autonomy-enhancing, their
affront is not based on an objection that they themselves will be guided by this
notion (as they are free to reject any such guidance). Rather (assuming there
are no external effects), their affront must be premised on their objection to
others being allowed to benefit from such empowerment. This observation
implies that Oman’s critique of grounding contract in autonomy is premised
on a demand that law respects those people’s “external preferences,” namely,

paternalism — see Jonathan Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection 85-96
(2011) — is inapplicable to choice theory, which concerns the state’s obligation
in contract law specifically.
31 Leslie Green, What is Freedom For? (Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 77, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2193674.
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their views as to the proper “assignment of goods and opportunities to others.”32
As Ronald Dworkin argued, taking this type of preference seriously violates,
rather than vindicates, “the right of everyone to be treated with equal concern
and respect.”33
Indeed, the practical implication of Oman’s celebration of relatively
content-less contract rules that cater to commerce’s needs is to delimit the
scope of contract’s empowerment potential to the commercial sphere. Oman
may be correct in saying that this understanding of contract reflects the status
quo — it reifies the Willistonian paradigm that is blind, as choice theory
demonstrates, to the skewed way in which contract’s empowering potential
is distributed; and it thus marginalizes the urgency of our reform proposals
for enriching the repertoire of contract types in the spheres of home, work,
and intimacy. But this quietism is far from neutral. Quite the contrary: it
arbitrarily disfavors these noncommercial spheres of human interaction that
are, for many (most?) people, at least as significant as commerce.
We do not deny that some of our autonomy-enhancing reform proposals that
expand the empowering potential of contracts to noncommercial spheres are
controversial.34 But controversy in and of itself is not a principled objection.
And because no credible vision of liberalism — as modest as it may be — can
discard the injunction of respecting all persons equally, no credible version
of liberalism can downgrade people’s equal right to choose — or, indeed,
to discover — their own path (or, for that matter, authorize their systemic
subordination, a point we discuss later).35
C. Autonomy without Perfectionism
Yitzhak Benbaji’s Article implies that these responses may not be subtle enough.
Benbaji helpfully highlights the distance between choice theory’s normative
32 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 275 (1977).
33 Id.
34 Oman invokes the inapplicability of choice theory to the discussions about samesex marriage as evidence of “the difficulty of defending . . . liberal institutions
. . . using autonomy.” Oman, supra note 2, at 391. Choice theory is indeed
orthogonal for this discussion — not for the reason Oman mentions, but rather
because the issue there is that a liberal state must make the (autonomy-enhancing)
institution (or contract-type) of marriage equally available to everyone.
35 It is thus no surprise that even harsh critics of perfectionist liberalism sanction
legal practices that combat practices of (women’s) subordination and ensure
people’s ability “to leave one view and opt for another.” Martha C. Nussbaum,
Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism, 39 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3, 29,
36 (2011).
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commitment to self-determination “as its basic, organizing, value” and Millean
perfectionism, whose ultimate value is “the quality of life of humans.”36 But he
still thinks that a commitment to autonomy is overly perfectionist and is thus
unqualified to serve as contract’s telos. Benbaji claims that only “freedom as
independence and instrumental rationality” should “justify devising a contract
law that shapes and imposes contract types.”37 This means that contract law
should “empower[ ] individuals to act together,” either to secure their ability
“to abide by their universal moral duties” or to ensure to them the provision
of resources — “stable income and wealth” — that are needed “in order to
form and pursue a conception of the good life, whatever this conception of
the good might be.”38
His approach to contract is “inspired by the neutralist anti-perfectionism
that underlies Rawlsian political liberalism.”39 This inspiration offers a nonperfectionist contract law, one that insists that “the duty of states to provide
contract types” is analogous to their duty to provide roads.40 The core idea is
that, pace choice theory’s injunction to ensure “demand-insensitive diversity,”
contract law should be guided only “by people’s pre-existing needs and
preferences,” and therefore its supply of contract types “must be dictated by
demand.”41 Focusing solely on demand allows this strategy to uproot choice
theory’s perfectionism, because it implies that law refrains from “shaping
and imposing contract types” by reference to “worthy life plans and choice.”42
It thus ensures that the state does not engage in forming “value judgements
about the worthiness of the options” it offers to its citizens, thereby securing
contract law’s legitimacy.43
Benbaji presents this program as “a teleological understanding of contract
types,” which is “an attractive alternative to the way choice theory understands
them.”44 However, clarifying the distance between choice theory and liberal
perfectionism, on the one hand, and the important way in which contract types
are incomparable to roads, on the other, implies that Rawlsian neutralism
must subscribe to choice theory rather than challenge it.
It is no coincidence that Choice Theory does not use the adjective
“perfectionist” to describe choice theory. This omission reflects the important
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Benbaji, supra note 2, at 414, 419.
Id., at 430.
Id., at 426, 428.
Id., at 428.
Id., at 424.
Id.
Id., at 430.
Id., at 414.
Id., at 427.
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gap, mentioned by Benbaji, between the views of Mill (and Joseph Raz) and
ours. While we indeed rely on the robust understanding of freedom as autonomy
(or self-determination or self-authorship, terms we use interchangeably),
for us, as Benbaji notes, autonomy is an ultimate value, rather than a means
to secure a “rich and satisfying . . . life in terms of human perfections and
excellences,” as it is positioned in the Mill/Raz view.45 This is why our
approach to paternalism is very different from that of Millean perfectionists,
as Benbaji acknowledges. But it is also why choice theory does not include
an account of “human perfections and excellences,” and is not implicated in
troublesome perfectionism.
The distance of choice theory from perfectionist views that adjudicate the
worthiness of people’s conceptions of the good is evident in its prescriptions
on both the formation of the inventory of contract types and the reasons that
“limit unworthy contractual relations.”46 Thus, choice theory prescribes that
law’s repertoire of contract types for each sphere of human interaction must
include a sufficient number of partial functional substitutes, so that it offers
people alternatives. And one of the ways in which such a meaningful choice
can be secured, we have argued, is by enriching this repertoire by investing
in minoritarian or utopian contract types. Hence, the demand-insensitivity of
choice theory involves neither censorship nor worth-ranking.
Note, choice theory does not embrace every type of contractual relation. But
it is important to precisely define its justifications for limiting the repertoire
of contract types. Like most (if not all) contract theories, it pays attention
to — and would recommend limiting — systemic externalities. To this banal
limitation, choice theory adds two important autonomy-based limits, which
we introduce now and discuss in (a little) more detail below:
(1) Choice theory takes seriously contract’s role in facilitating autonomy,
and thus requires contract law to always be wary of the possible
detrimental implications of its operations for the autonomy of the
parties’ future selves.
(2) Choice theory requires that people’s use of law’s coercive power
be limited to interactions that comply with its ultimate justification
of reciprocal respect to self-determination, so that relational justice
must serve as the floor of legitimate interactions eligible for law’s
support.
It seems to us that the Rawlsian minimalist position, which Benbaji develops,
would concur (or at least not object to) these positions. Benbaji does not
45 Id., at 414.
46 Id., at 420.
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challenge — indeed, he embraces47 — choice theory’s critique of the “Kantian
minimalist” position (as he calls it), in which the enforcement of contracts
can be justified by reference only to people’s duty of reciprocal respect to
independence. Furthermore, and unlike Oman, Benbaji does not repudiate the
liberal commitment to facilitating people’s pursuit of their own life plans; in
fact, he argues that Rawls’ first principle of justice, which ensures people “a
fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties,” is the premise of “empower[ing]
individuals to act together by entering a contract that determines the terms of
their collaboration.”48 This means, we think, that Benbaji must acknowledge
the ineradicable autonomy-enhancing role of contract in a liberal polity, as
well as its implications noted in the previous two paragraphs.
Benbaji’s contracts/roads analogy need not undermine this conclusion
— and the happy convergence between his position and choice theory —
because, alongside the important similarities between contract types and
roads, there are also significant differences. Benbaji notes that contracts, and
thus also contract types, indeed piggyback on people’s preexisting goals and
obligations. But contract types are nonetheless very different from roads, at
least if roads are understood as Benbaji presents them, in the (almost) strictly
instrumental way of reaching a destination, which implies that other types of
road — say, scenic roads — are rare and indeed esoteric exceptions.49 The
reason for this, as far as contracts are concerned, is that how we achieve these
preexisting goals does matter; and, at times, it matters a lot. This is exactly
our point in emphasizing the importance of intra-sphere multiplicity and the
empowerment it confers on people.
We are not saying there are no cases in which people would be indifferent
to contract types as long as they get them to their desired destination. But,
more often than not — even in commerce, the seemingly-classical instrumental
sphere — people are not indifferent. (Think, for example, about the choice
between a franchise and commercial agency contract, which is partly understood
“as a decision between creating thin and thick contractual communities.”50)
While contracts, like roads, are somewhat constrained by preexisting goals,
in contract-land the significance of multiplicity is not esoteric.

47 Id., at 422.
48 Id., at 430.
49 The cautionary language of the text is not coincidental. With Benbaji, we assume
that “regular” roads are, by and large, demand-sensitive, setting aside further
contexts in which states build roads to create demand, for instance when they
plan to establish new communities. See Benbaji, supra note 2, at 425.
50 Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 63.
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To circle back, Fried’s articulation (in his contribution to this Issue) of the
value of distinct contract types captures the justification for expecting law
to enrich proactively our repertoire of such types. Contract types, he writes,
“offer parties a menu of possible interactions”51 that are crucial for “party
autonomy and self-fulfillment . . . because human interactions and legal
interventions are hardly imaginable without them.”52 Just like “language that
enables thought[,] without types, our minds would be blank.” In response
to Benbaji, then, we cite with approval Fried’s point that contract types are
“enabling our liberties.”53

II. Choice: Challenging, But Real
We turn now from freedom to choice, which stands at the center of three other
articles in this Issue, by Aditi Bagchi, Gregory Klass, and Oren Bar-Gill and
Clayton Gillette. Bagchi is concerned that we overstate the work of choice
theory in enhancing autonomy, and understate (and maybe even obscure) the
most important obstacles to people’s autonomous choice. Klass and Bar-Gill
and Gillette turn the focus inwards, asking (respectively) how can choice
— and thus autonomy — be enhanced via attention to, and development of,
contract types, and which legal actors, if any, can perform this task?54
A. Multiplicity and Justice
Aditi Bagchi criticizes our focus on contract types and our inattention to
more important impediments to choice. She argues that, because oftentimes
“the point of contracting”55 is simply to assure promisees “that they will get
something in return for conferring something of benefit on the promisor”
(or to comply with their preexisting moral duty),56 the fact that an obligation
was “assumed voluntarily does not tell us how important the agent was to
the fact of its adoption, let alone its form or content,” and “it does not answer
how much of a voluntary obligation is explained by the moral make-up of its

Fried, supra note 2, at 378.
Id.
Id., at 377.
Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz also address this question. But because
their institutional critique is entailed by their substantive one, we address them
below together.
55 Bagchi, supra note 2, at 450.
56 Id., at 451.

51
52
53
54
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author.”57 This observation implies, Bagchi claims, that while the exercise
of the normative power to promise tells us that the promisor is “the kind of
person who others regard as capable of authoring obligation,” it “does not
tell us much more than that.”58 This means that “[m]any contractual promises
poorly reflect the moral agency of contracting parties,”59 which leaves our
focus on “the kinds of contract forms recognized or enabled by the state”
unexplained.60
Moreover, Bagchi contends that “[e]xpanding the menu of contract types
would do little to expand more salient choices,”61 and might even “deflect
our attention from these more important constraints that inhibit people’s
choices.”62 Thus, she maintains, “it is not clear how expanding the menu of
contract types in [the employment] sphere importantly advances employees’
interests — from the standpoint of autonomy,” because “for the array of
employment types to be relevant, employees need to be in a position . . . to
trade off income in exchange for a contractual relationship that suits them in
other respects.”63 Furthermore, Bagchi argues that we are “wrong to focus
on the state as a direct regulator of individual transactions . . . as opposed
to its broader role as a regulator and participant in the market,” for it is “in
the latter role that it has the capacity to affect the material conditions under
which parties make contract choices.”64
We agree with Bagchi’s claim that it is important to “unpack the moral
significance of promising and assess” how well different promises “serve
the underlying values which cause us to value promises as such,” and that
there may well be “normatively significant variation among promises.”65 But
this proposition does not imply that “market-constrained promises” are the
least “valuable or morally significant”66 ones, or that expanding the range of
contract types entails only marginal normative value.
To start with, even regarding the most extreme examples (of promises
intended to satisfy the promisor’s decision “to eat, live in housing rather than
on the street, obtain medical care, etc.”67), the more alternatives people have
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id., at 436.
Id.
Id., at 455.
Id., at 438.
Id., at 434.
Id., at 436.
Id.
Id., at 438.
Id., at 440 n.9.
Id., at 443.
Id., at 451.
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among contract types (or among providers), the better, from the standpoint
of autonomy. Moreover, Bagchi overly discounts contract’s contribution to
autonomy even where it is made under substantial material or moral constraints.
She defines this value as a function of what it reveals “about an agent and her
moral capacities.”68 But she unduly slights the significance of “future-oriented
revelations.” Because contract — for both the haves and the have-nots — is a
future-oriented device, expanding the range of contract types is, other things
being equal, autonomy-enhancing.
Consider the employment sphere. Bagchi agrees with our critique of “the
stark choice between the status of employee and independent contractor,” but
insists: “the vast majority of people do not make any such choice,” because
“they take what is available, or maximizes their income,” so it “would not
help them if there were intermediate categories recognized in employment
law.”69 But would enriching the existing employment landscape, along the
lines we suggest in Choice Theory, actually be of only marginal significance?
Wouldn’t (potential) employees be better-off (autonomy-wise) if law were to
facilitate, for example, job-sharing arrangements? Or what about if states were
to promulgate two or more employment types, so that employers would need
to select one visibly (instead of the “at will” regime mandated everywhere
except for Montana, with its “for cause” regime)? And — turning from
employment to the housing sphere — wouldn’t the predicament of middleand lower-income households (respectively) be improved if law followed our
recommendations proactively to facilitate home equity insurance and shared
equity contract types?
Bagchi may not dispute that these would be improvements, but still insist
that the more pressing difficulty for choice, and thus for autonomy, lies in the
material conditions under which parties make contract choices, and that choice
theory may deflect attention from these concerns as addressing them seems
beyond the “institutional capacity of contract law.”70 This is an important
concern, especially given the significant wealth and power disparities that
typify contemporary societies. So if choice theory indeed had such disturbing
consequences, this would justifiably undermine its credibility. Fortunately,
this is not the case.
We do not deny that background distributive injustices limit the ability
of contract law, and thus of choice theory, to enhance autonomy. In fact, one
implication of our claim that a power-conferring institution such as contract
(or property) relies for its legitimacy on a commitment to self-determination
68 Id., at 436.
69 Id., at 438.
70 Id. 437
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is that this legitimacy, in turn, cannot be plausibly freestanding, but rather
depends upon a robust background regime that guarantees everyone the material
preconditions needed for self-authorship.71 This is an important lesson that
we should have clarified in Choice Theory. But the point does not undermine
the major autonomy-enhancing role of contract law (properly understood to
apply to all contractual spheres and encompass rules originating from courts,
legislatures, and regulatory agencies alike).
To see why, recall that choice theory entails a commitment to relational
justice as the floor of legitimate interactions eligible for law’s support. Now,
consider the implications of this commitment to employment and labor law.
As we argued in Choice Theory, relational equality underlies labor law’s (far
from adequate) facilitation of workers’ unionization and collective bargaining.
Moreover, the hierarchical organization that typifies the workplace explains
employment law’s insistence on an inalienable infrastructure of just relationships,
dealing with topics such as workplace safety and nondiscrimination.72 And
this hierarchy may well justify further reinforcement of workers’ autonomy
by entrenching a workplace bill of rights to protect them against managers’
arbitrary and unaccountable authority, particularly insofar as they purport to
regulate workers’ off-hour lives.73 Finally, appreciating the role of reciprocal
respect to self-determination as contract’s normative foundation implies that
contract law cannot legitimately instrumentalize people to such an extent
that it effaces their humanity by erasing their ability to self-determine. This
prescription applies to employment settings such as sweatshops, in which
workers are arguably dehumanized and treated as disposable commodities.74
There are, of course, also other justifications for these propositions. But
grounding them on the autonomy-based foundations of choice theory is
nonetheless important, because this implies that friends of contract and
champions of individual autonomy cannot but support the implications of
choice theory that we have just mentioned, and should work to eradicate the
autonomy-reducing conditions choice theory’s reformist takeaways seek to
transform.

71 See Hanoch Dagan, A Liberal Theory of Property ch. 3 (forthcoming 2020).
72 See Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, The Other Half of Regulatory Theory,
Conn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019); Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just
Relationships, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1395, 1442-45 (2016).
73 See Elizabeth Anderson, Private Government: How Employers Rule Our Lives
(and Why We Don’t Talk about It) 39-40, 48-54, 60, 62-64, 67-69 (2017).
74 See Hanoch Dagan, Markets for Self-Authorship, 27 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
577, 598 (2018).
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B. The Mechanisms of Choice
Gregory Klass embraces — or at least, accepts — choice theory’s claim as
to the significance of both a choice among contract types, and the power
to choose to alter individual terms of a type.75 What is more, his extended
discussion of the differences between parol evidence rules that apply — and
rightly so — to different contract types importantly supports choice theory’s
emphasis on contract law’s multiplicity. But he is critical of Choice Theory’s
neglect of “the mechanics of choice,” namely: the questions surrounding “how
contracting parties make choices” and the “legal mechanisms for choosing,”
with which “the law determines the choices they have made.”76
Thus, Klass’ careful and interesting account of the parol evidence rule adds
an important example to choice theory’s prescription for tailoring contract
rules to the contract type, rather than imposing a set of one-size-fits-all rules
on the entire inventory of contract types. While it is “widely recognized that
different U.S. jurisdictions employ different parol evidence rules,” he notes,
most accounts of those rules “describe one parol evidence rule for all contracts.”77
Klass studies two contract types — negotiated contracts between firms, and
consumer contracts — that both respond, in his view, to the same normative
(welfarist) concerns.78 His analysis “suggests parol evidence rules for these
spheres that significantly differ from the common, generic formulations of the
rule, and from each other.”79 In line with choice theory, Klass concludes that
“there is not, or [at least] should not be, one big parol evidence rule, but local
parol evidence rules for distinct spheres of contracting.”80 This multiplicity,
he further argues, brings home his more critical lesson for choice theory:
that it must pay “greater attention to both the mechanics of choice and the
available mechanisms of choice.”81
Klass’ claim that the two contract types he investigated allow him to “hold
normative concerns constant,”82 is exaggerated, in our view. We certainly
agree that negotiated contracts between firms should be analyzed, by and
large, as a means of maximizing the parties’ gains from trade, and that the
welfare gains to both parties are also critical for consumer contracts. But we
believe Klass’ claim that “the values at stake are similar” and that therefore the
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Klass, supra note 2, at 461.
Id., at 458.
Id., at 463.
Id., at 484.
Id., at 473.
Id., at 463.
Id., at 486.
Id.
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goal of contract law in this type as well should simply be “to help both sides
maximize the gains of trade”83 is overstated. Indeed, our “errand conception”
of consumer contracts (which Klass mentions) implies that this contract type
scores best in the autonomy-enhancement test if it is designed so that “law
helps people make such transactions quickly, anonymously, and securely so
they can focus their time and attention instead on other — more valuable (for
them) — projects,”84 which means that “the non-bargained terms correspond
to (or exceed) consumers’ typical expectations.”85
With that caveat in mind, we agree with Klass’ claim that the (existing
and desirable) distinctions between the different parol evidence rules, which
indeed are all intended to serve as mechanisms of choice, follow from the
“important differences between the mechanics of choice in consumer contracts
and those [in] negotiated contracts between firms.”86 This is an important
refinement of choice theory: the design of contract types “should reflect not
only the values at stake, but also the mechanics of choice in each sphere.”87
In Choice Theory, we acknowledged the significance of studying what
Klass aptly terms “the mechanics of choice,” namely, the “parties’ preexisting
abilities to choose, and the conditions under which they are able to make
informed, autonomous and therefore valuable choices.”88 But Klass must be
right that, in addition to insights from cognitive psychology, choice theory
must resort to the good old-fashioned work of doctrinal technique. To develop
a truly autonomy-enhancing contract law, significant attention needs to be
paid to what he terms “the mechanisms of choice,” including “the tools that
the law gives [or can give] parties for exercising their power to choose.”89
Klass is also correct in observing that the mechanics of choice are relevant
not only to “parties’ ability to choose contract terms,” but also to “their choice
among pre-established contract-types,”90 because “party choice can operate to
enhance autonomy and resolve competing values only when parties are willing
and able to choose.”91 Klass focuses, in this context, on the practical viability
of the mechanisms that may enable workers’ and consumers’ choice among
contract types (as in the choice between being employees or independent
83 Id., at 485.
84 Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 81. See also Klass, supra note 2, at 480
(referring to “considerations of fairness”).
85 Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 83.
86 Klass, supra note 2, at 480.
87 Id., at 484.
88 Id., at 461.
89 Id., at 462.
90 Id., at 485.
91 Id., at 486.
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contractors, or between purchasing a good with the safeguards of consumer
protection law or sales law).92 But, in fact, the significance of the mechanisms
of choice to choice theory goes even deeper than that.
In addressing the challenge of ex post boundary disputes among contract
types, we noted in Choice Theory that such “boundary arbitrage concerns
may justify heightened formalities for entry — and such formalities should
be refined with a view to ensuring that both parties have the same contract
type in mind.”93 But Klass’ (justified) focus on the role of the mechanisms
of choice implies that these formalities are much more important to choice
theory than we appreciated. This is because viable formalities that improve
contract law’s mechanisms of choice among contract types help minimize
the inevitable “independence costs” that a properly autonomy-enhancing
contract law inevitably entails.
Recall that one of the most fundamental claims of choice theory (endorsed by
Fried) is that law needs to proactively generate robust contractual conventions
to expand the scope of people’s voluntary obligations, which in turn empowers
their self-determination. But as the legal infrastructure becomes increasingly
elaborate — which it does in modern contract law, as we show in Part III — the
risk that it will apply not only to fully voluntary obligations becomes increasingly
real. Involuntariness is a problem that an autonomy-enhancing contract
law must take seriously, because it infringes the promisor’s independence,
which is, as noted, intrinsically valuable.94 To some extent, this risk can be
— and again, is — reduced by making the conventions of contract explicit
and, therefore, more socially transparent. Like other major legal constructs
(especially of private law), contract tends to become part of the backdrop of
our lives and blend into our natural environment.95 But an autonomy-enhancing
contract law should not be content with this partial safeguard against the risk
of involuntariness.
Two features of contract law proactively respond to this risk. The first is
straightforward: familiar doctrines — notably duress and misrepresentation —
delimit the scope of enforceable promises to those that are not the product of
the promisee’s manipulation of the promisor’s free will. The second important
92 Id., at 462-63, 488.
93 Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 129.
94 In other words, while Peter Benson is wrong to attribute to us the view that “the
power-conferring character of contract law [implies] recognizing party capacity
to effectuate legal changes that they deliberately undertake and purposively seek
to achieve” (Benson, supra note 2, at 544-45, emphasis ours), choice theory does
seek to shape a contract regime that optimally empowers people to cooperate
through voluntary undertakings.
95 Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 76.
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feature deals with contract law’s “entry rules” and was highlighted by Lon
Fuller’s classic account of the functions performed by legal formalities. As Fuller
noted, the significance of form in law goes beyond its evidentiary function. A
formality, such as the requirement of writing — as well as the parol evidence
rule, on which Klass focuses — also performs channeling and cautionary (or
deterrent) functions by offering “channels for the legally effective expression
of intention” and by “acting as a check against inconsiderate action.”96
While safe “in the hands of those who are familiar with their effects,”
legal forms — like any other form (Fuller, like Fried in his account of choice
theory, drew an analogy to language) — are not risk-free, but rather contain
“dangers for the uninitiated.”97 This means that the performance of legal forms
in minimizing the risk of involuntariness depends on their proper refinement
and advertisement. By crystalizing, as choice theory prescribes, a stable set
of contract types, each with its own animating principle, and by carefully
adjusting — as per Klass’ important prescription — their entry rules to the
pertinent mechanism of choice with an eye to these channeling and deterrent
functions, a robust contract law performs better than a thinner one. Having
in mind a salient model (or a few salient models) of the intended transaction
likely reduces the probability of misunderstandings and thus involuntariness
— at least by comparison with the alternative of contracting through the
necessarily vague open-ended general contract law.98
C. Choice Theory and Political Economy
But who can undertake the task of crafting contract types so that they indeed
fulfill contract’s promise of enhancing our autonomy? In Choice Theory, we
raised this institutional question in connection with familiar concerns about
the capacities of legal institutions — notably, generalist courts — to create
good rules for sophisticated commercial parties. We did not doubt that such
private parties are more competent for the task than are competing legal
institutions. We did argue, however, that there is no reason to extrapolate more
devastating conclusions from the commercial context — that is, to suggest that
no legal institutions are sufficiently competent to implement choice theory.
Rather, “implementing choice theory is a matter of comparative institutional
96 Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799, 800-01 (1941).
97 Id., at 802.
98 Cf. Barry Nicholas, The French Law of Contract 57 (2nd ed. 1992) (noting
that, because French lawyers are conscious of the traits of different contrats
nommés, contracting parties can be presumed to intentionally attempt to choose
their preferred contract type).
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competence,”99 so that, while “in the commercial sphere . . . private parties [are
likely] to dominate contract type creation . . . in the family and employment
spheres, other, more public actors, may take the lead.”100 Even in these spheres,
legal institutions are surely not perfect for the task. But they are, or at least
likely to be, better suited than the contracting parties.
Choice Theory offers some preliminary thoughts on possible strategies
for coping with concerns of institutional competence — what we call the
comparative, the experimental, and the incremental strategies — alongside
some examples, such as the judicial recognition of cohabitation, which shows
“the significant compliance (though imperfect and insufficient) of evolving
contract law with the obligation to support multiplicity.”101 We acknowledged
that much more work needs to be done on this front, noting that “full answers
will inevitably be linked to a particular contract type or a specific state or
national institutional design.”102
Bar-Gill and Gillette add an important dimension to this institutional
analysis by focusing on political economy.103 They are justifiably concerned
with the “traditional claim that government can readily solve market failure,”
which “treats government actors as cognizant of and motivated by (1) a widely
shared view of the public interest, (2) the extent to which market failures
inhibit achievement of that public interest, and (3) the tools and political will
necessary to implement policies that align with that interest.”104 Bar-Gill and
Gillette conclude that “Dagan and Heller’s faith in governmental processes to
develop contract types is overstated,” since we are not sufficiently sensitive to
“the public good nature of governance,” which implies the endemic collective
action problems of government intervention.105
At times, these problems imply that government might undersupply contract
types, by either “affirmatively suppressing contract types that the market
Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 128.
Id., at 131.
Id., at 15.
Id., at 132.
Bar-Gill and Gillette also address the issue of competence, arguing that “government
would generally lack the access to information necessary to identify the optimal
number of contract types.” Bar-Gill & Gillette, supra note 2, at 487. We do
not underestimate the significance of this task, but the evident undersupply of
contract types in the non-commercial spheres of contracting — on which choice
theory’s prescription focuses — makes this concern premature. Another concern
they raise relates to the imprecision of the distinction between different terms
and different types. We discuss this matter in Section III.B.
104 Id., at 487.
105 Id.
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would create” or failing “to produce a contract type that the market fails to
generate, and that government is uniquely positioned to produce.”106 A parallel
and — for Bar-Gill and Gillette — “greater concern,” is that of oversupply
of contract types,107 either “because interest groups with disproportionate
access to the [pertinent] agency . . . lobby for an excessive number of types”
or because “individuals in those agencies have incentives to create them in
order to demonstrate to clients (congressmen, interest groups) or to superiors
within the agency that they are performing their assigned function.” Finally,
even if government actors were to produce contract types optimal in quantity,
“government intervention could cause suboptimal terms to be part of a contract
type.”108
Bar-Gill and Gillette do not ignore that institutional inquiries are always
comparative. They fully realize that the alternative to government involvement
is leaving the task to the market, and that this alternative is also far from
perfect. Indeed, Bar-Gill and Gillette agree with choice theory’s premise
that “standard market failures might cause markets to produce a suboptimal
number of contract types,”109 although they also show that these failures
may push in the opposite direction at times, resulting in the provision of too
many contract types. But Bar-Gill and Gillette are still concerned that the
political economy consideration they highlight may suggest that government
involvement “might do more harm than good.”110 Thus, they conclude that,
whereas the lack of an “ideal mechanism” for implementing choice theory
“does not deny [its] efficacy,” we need to be careful not to replace “market
failure with government failure” that “replicate[s], rather than cure[s], the
shortcomings of markets.”111
Point well taken. Adding political economy considerations to the comparative
analysis of the expected performance of the pertinent institutions is surely
important, and there may well be contexts in which the expected shortcomings
of government agencies would imply that we may be better off leaving the task
to the market, notwithstanding its deficiencies. This conclusion justifies Bar-Gill
106 Id.
107 Bar-Gill and Gillette are concerned about over-supply because an “excessively
large number of contract types” is inefficient, as it tends to reduce the positive
externality of comparison-shopping and thus dilute the forces of competition.
Id., at 492. Oversupply may also undermine autonomy, given people’s cognitive
constraints.
108 Id., at 487.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.

618

Theoretical Inquiries in Law

[Vol. 20.2:595

and Gillette’s “cautionary note.”112 But nothing in this note is different from
parallel concerns of “government failure” regarding the numerous contexts in
which agencies are currently involved. And yet, the least controversial set of
justifications for regulation by governmental agencies includes various types
of market failure — that is, cases in which, for reasons such as monopolies
or anti-competitive behavior, externalities or public goods, or informational
inadequacies, an “uncontrolled marketplace” is likely to “fail to produce
behavior or results in accordance with the public interest.”113 Yes, a rosy story
of government must be rejected, but there is no reason to choose instead a
particularly gloomy account of the supply of contract types.
Further, when we referred to the responsibility of legal institutions to
contract’s autonomy-enhancing telos, we did not limit our account to agencies.
On the contrary, we mentioned a long list of pertinent legal actors, highlighting
“courts or legislatures — the ordinary contract lawmakers in liberal societies.”114
One (relatively) happy story we noted is the judicial creation of the law of
cohabitation that structures “a distinct contract type which helps stabilize
relationships of long-term informal intimacy between marriage and, say,
roommates.” Courts’ responsiveness to “an emerging — albeit minoritarian —
innovation,” we argued, is laudable from an autonomy-enhancing perspective,
especially given the “failure of cohabitants to gain legislative recognition,”
which “may be best explained by a collective action and political economy
story.”115
The case of cohabitation may suggest a surprising but potentially important
conclusion. Recall that our engagement with the institutional question in
Choice Theory was aimed at limiting the incompetence critique of legal actors
— in particular, judges — to the commercial context. Bar-Gill and Gillette’s
focus on political economy implies that, at least in contexts where generalist
judges do not suffer from this difficulty — that is, in the contracting spheres
of work, housing, and intimacy where the injunction to proactively facilitate
multiplicity applies most strongly116 — courts should play a particularly
important role in implementing choice theory.117 This conclusion nicely fits
the common law tradition in which much of private law is the result the
112 Id.
113 Robert Baldwin et al., Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and
Practice 15 (2nd ed. 2012).
114 Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 130.
115 Id., at 132.
116 Id., at Ch. 11.
117 We do not deny that, even in these spheres, the private law of contract types
may require regulatory support. See id., at 76-78.
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continuous law-making through judicial activity.118 It also fortifies the claim
that, notwithstanding Bar-Gill and Gillette’s important cautionary note, “[t]here
is room to implement choice theory such that contract law does a better job
than the status quo in enhancing people’s self-determination.”119

III. Contracts: Choice Theory and The Canon
We conclude this Article by engaging with important concerns that have been
expressed regarding our understanding of contract. The first two are raised by
Peter Benson, who argues that “choice theory does not seem to articulate a
satisfactory conception of the reasonable for contract,” and that it fails “when
assessed both as an interpretation of the law and also as a justification of its
coercive character.”120 Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz, in turn, argue that
choice theory’s embracing of multiplicity comes “at the cost of abandoning
theoretical depth and coherence,” which is not ameliorated by our appeal to
autonomy as contract’s “master value.”121 This difficulty is profound, because
it means that either choice theory cannot plausibly guide decision-makers or
that its guidance is so cumbersome as to make its implementation unlikely,
if not strictly implausible.
A. Reciprocal Respect to Self-Determination and Contract Enforcement
Benson appreciates our invocation of John Rawls’ “account of the moral
powers of free and equal citizens,” which “gives center-place to the moral
power to form and rationally to pursue a conception of one’s own good.”122
But he reads choice theory as solely fixated on this “idea of the ‘rational’” and
entirely neglectful of the other basic component of Rawls’ theory, namely: “the
reasonable,” which is “an intrinsically moral idea involving moral sensibility
in general and a sense of justice in particular.” The reasonable is important —
both in general and for contract — because it requires persons to “act from
fair principles for social interaction and cooperation,” and thus to respect “the
118 See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Principles of Legal Reasoning in the Common
Law, in Common Law Theory 81, 82 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., 2007). For a defense
of the role of judges in the development of private law, see Hanoch Dagan, Judges
and Property, in Intellectual Property and the Common Law 17 (Shyam
Balganesh ed., 2013).
119 Bar-Gill & Gillette, supra note 2, at 502.
120 Benson, supra note 2, at 540.
121 Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 577.
122 Benson, supra note 2, at 547.
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equality and independent claims of others and expect[] the same in return
from them.” It thus imposes “genuine obligations toward others and, where
justified, these obligations can be coercively enforceable.”123
A second, and somewhat related,124 objection Benson raises is that, despite
our aspiration “to provide an interpretative framework for presenting contract
law in [its] best light,” our book fails “to show with the needed detail that
[choice theory] is reflected even in the main contract doctrines.”125 He believes
that “this cannot be done,” making reference in this context to the doctrines
governing contract formation, to the objective standard, as well as to “the
whole implied dimension of a contract (including implied terms, obligations,
impossibility, mistake etc.) and the entire range of remedies for breach.”126
Furthermore, Benson argues, without the component of reasonableness,
choice theory cannot account for “the requisite nexus between promisor
and promisee”127 — linking here the “question of interpretative fit” with
the requirement to “justify the basic moral fact that contractual duties are
coercively enforceable.” Choice theory, Benson concedes, may imply that
“[o]ne who voluntarily recruits another or accepts being recruited by another
through such a device is required to perform what she has promised in order
to fulfill this duty.” But this duty, he insists, is only “some sort of general
positive duty” to “support and further a regime of voluntary contracts” that
“enables individuals to advance their ends — hence their autonomy,” so
“the most plausible obligee” is not the promisee, but rather “the community
of present and future transactors or perhaps the body that is responsible for
maintaining the regime of cooperation.” He continues: “To establish the
requisite nexus between promisor and promisee, it is essential to show that
there is a requirement of reasonableness that holds as between them,” which
— and this is the key for Benson — “choice theory fails to do.”128
Benson is right to insist that a Rawlsian component of reasonableness
is necessary to justify contract enforcement, and this dimension is core
for accounting for the status of the promisee as the right-holder authorized
to invoke enforcement proceedings. But the fact that Choice Theory did
123 Id., at 548.
124 As the text hints, Benson’s complaint of fit is only somewhat related to his
reading of choice theory as lacking the component of reasonableness, because
part of the difficulty he sees in choice theory as an interpretive account of contract
derives from the extreme and unnecessarily demanding understanding of “powerconferring character” he attributes to choice theory. See supra note 94.
125 Benson, supra note 2, at 546-47.
126 Id., at 545-46.
127 Id., at 550.
128 Id., at 550-51.
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not employ Rawls’ vocabulary of the rational and the reasonable, does not
signify that choice theory does not appreciate the role of reciprocal respect
to the equal claims of others as a necessary foundation for the legitimacy of
contract and its interpersonal character. Indeed, while choice theory celebrates
the autonomy-enhancing role of contracts, it explicitly recognizes that the
legitimacy of recruiting law’s coercive power for its entrenchment — and
thus the scope of contract law’s legitimate power — both depend upon a prior
interpersonal obligation.
Much of Part I of Choice Theory argues that earlier attempts to face this
legitimacy challenge, including Benson’s, predictably fail, because they
ask the wrong question. They seek to justify the duty contract imposes,
even though people’s interpersonal obligations are exhausted by reciprocal
respect for each other’s independence. But starting from “the obligation of
reciprocal respect for self-determination that underlies private law” shows
that “there is nothing mysterious in the duty to perform.”129 Our reference to
private law here was not accidental, as we demonstrated in the subsequent
pages in Choice Theory referring to the (modest) affirmative interpersonal
duties private law imposes.
As one of us has argued in detail elsewhere, these affirmative duties are not
a blemish on a liberal private law. On the contrary: the facts of interdependence
and personal difference — and thus the vulnerability and the valuable options
to which these social conditions give rise — imply that the liberal commitment
to individual self-determination cannot be excluded from the law governing
horizontal relationships.130 This means that, although private law should take
seriously the typically excessive interference with people’s autonomy that
affirmative interpersonal duties to aid others entail, it need not — indeed
should not — subscribe to a blanket rejection of affirmative duties in private
law, as prior formulations of contract legitimacy challenge imply.
This cautionary note explains the suspicion of liberal law towards affirmative
duties (a point to which we return when we explain and justify the common
law’s preference for pecuniary remedies). It also explains the actual workings
of private law, namely, the many affirmative duties it does acknowledge,
which typically involve — in line with Hart’s dictum131 — an infringement
of independence that does not seriously jeopardize self-determination. And
it is exactly this point that provides the key to the legitimacy of contract
enforcement. If affirmative interpersonal duties are categorically excluded
129 Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 42.
130 See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 72; Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman,
Justice in Private: Beyond the Rawlsian Framework, 37 L. & Phil. 171 (2018).
131 See supra text accompanying note 11.
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from private law, it is indeed hard to explain how the autonomy-enhancing
implications of contract can legitimate its legal form. But once the spurious,
blanket rejection of affirmative duties from private law is rejected, we argue
in Choice Theory, the mystery of contract enforcement dissolves.
Indeed, private law’s Grundnorm of reciprocal respect to self-determination,
which governs people’s interpersonal relationships in a liberal polity, implies
that there is neither a way nor a reason to bypass the modest interpersonal
burden that law imposes on a promisor who voluntarily invokes the contract
convention while engaging with the promisee. Benson expresses this very
same point in Rawlsian vocabulary: “Because each side has chosen to do
something which brings into play the other as a co-equal participant with
separate and independent interests, each has chosen to enter a relation which
is subject to interpersonal norms and standards: each party, as a reasonable
person, must therefore recognize the fair and reasonable meaning of their
interaction as a transaction between two.”132
We will shortly address Benson’s second critique, regarding the challenge
of fit. But because part of our response to Markovits and Schwartz overlaps
with our response to this challenge, we will take both points in Part III.C. We
turn now to Markovits and Schwartz’s critique in which choice theory ends
up in the unhappy predicament of pre-Willistonian unprincipled multiplicity.
B. Principled, Structured, and Informative Pluralism
The focus of Markovits and Schwartz’s penetrating inquiry is the plurality of
values “that are openly and notoriously at play in contract practice,” which
renders, for them, “the life of the law too unruly to confine within any single
logic.”133 Markovits and Schwartz accept that philosophers might be able to
show that efficiency, autonomy, equality, and community (the four values
they mention) “cohere in a single framework or arise from a single basic
source.”134 But they believe that lawyers and judges necessarily resist any
such philosophical framework, because it is unlikely to address the more
concrete concerns with which law needs to engage.135
This limitation leaves contract theorists with three strategies for avoiding
the perils of pluralism, each with its own virtues and vices. First, they can
resort to capitulation, which “involves seeking domains that are insulated from

132
133
134
135

Benson, supra note 2, at 567.
Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 573.
Id., at 574.
Id., at 574-75.
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pluralism, because only one value governs them.”136 Markovits and Schwartz
illustrate this strategy by reference to their own prior work, explaining business
transactions through an efficiency lens (Schwartz & Scott) and agreements
regarding professional services through a community one (Markovits). They
candidly admit their own work illustrates the hazards resulting from the
artificial delimitation of contract’s domain and from the resulting distortion
that it inevitably generates.137
The second strategy for avoiding pluralism “flees in [the] opposite direction”
by leveraging, which “involves seeking domains to which pluralism applies
but only to create redundancies, because all values recommend the same
result.”138 This strategy seeks to identify pockets of contract practices in which
“irreducibly plural” values converge around a specific reformist argument.
Leveraging necessarily has “only a very narrow scope of application.”139
Markovits and Schwartz also identify a third and “very different”140 approach:
embracing value pluralism, which “does not flee from but rather embraces the
diversity of values at play in contract practice and also the varieties of practice
that arise in the shadow of these values.”141 This approach, Markovits and
Schwartz argue, typically requires the theorist to “abandon or at least retreat
from theory’s conventional simplifying ambitions in favor of interpreting
and displaying the complexity that practice unavoidably presents.”142 Choice
Theory, in their view, exemplifies this “embracing” strategy, as is most clearly
demonstrated by our taxonomy of contract’s domain.143 The taxonomy seeks
to “track lived experience,” and thus construct contract spheres and contract
types “out of the intuitive, pre-theoretical categories,” namely: “out of the
materials that parties, lawyers, and judges first look to when considering
drafting, litigating, or adjudicating contracts.”144
For Markovits and Schwartz, choice theory involves a tradeoff. They
acknowledge that embracing multiplicity has some virtues: choice theory
may avoid both the incompleteness and “the distortions that arise from
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

Id., at 580.
Id., at 576-78.
Id., at 580.
Id., at 578-80.
Id., at 575.
Id., at 580.
Id., at 575.
Id., at 576, 580.
Id., at 581. The other is our attempt to “highlight backwaters,” such as bailment,
to illustrate both “how fine-grained the taxonomy of contracts might become,”
and how even relatively obscure doctrines can demonstrate our theory. Id., at
580-84.
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viewing a multifaceted practice through a single lens.”145 But this virtue
entails a significant theoretical cost, because it leaves “the disorder associated
with accommodating too many values” intact, thus undermining “the point
of a theory, which is to explain something by organizing otherwise unruly
considerations into patterns that are simpler and more general than the pretheoretical practice to be explained.”146 This drawback, they insist, cannot be
avoided by our resort to autonomy as contract’s ultimate value: any attempt
to really subordinate choice theory’s pluralism to autonomy, they suggest,
is bound to be self-defeating. Why? Because it inevitably collapses choice
theory’s pluralism down to the capitulating strategy. In the end, they argue,
we are left with an account that is both too capacious and unstructured —and
indeed uninformative.147
As a result, choice theory cannot help with concrete legal practice. Markovits
and Schwartz argue, for example, that an open-ended embrace of pluralism
cannot arbitrate between an employment contract type that minimizes a
typical dyad’s contracting costs and one that generates a smaller expected
economic surplus because it “includes hiring disadvantaged persons.”148 This
indeterminacy implies that choice theory sets a task that “no institution could
do.”149
How did we go so far astray? Markovits and Schwartz suggest that the
source of our error lies in our background as property scholars. We were
(mis)led to analyze contract as if it were property, where “the state specifies
the forms that agents must use in order to hold property.”150 But contract rules
are dramatically different, because they function largely as implied terms.
If choice theory embraces value pluralism and seeks to avoid illegitimate
state impositions, then it must, in Markovits and Schwartz’ account, require
contract law to offer an implausibly large number of contract types, so as
to fit every possible value ranking respecting the (huge) range of possible
project descriptions, sets of goals, and sets of actions needed to achieve them.151
These are heavy charges. We discuss them in reverse order because our
answers to Markovits and Schwartz’s practical questions also jumpstart our
responses to their theoretical challenge.
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

Id., at 587.
Id., at 575.
Id., at 580, 582, 587.
Id., at 575.
Id., at 584.
Id., at 572, 573.
Id., at 583-86. This difficulty is exacerbated once we consider the heterogeneity
of the utility functions of parties to contracts outside the commercial spheres.
Id., at 585.
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First of all, we reject the sharp dichotomy between contract and property.
The categories are, in large measure, artificial silos. The continuities between
property and contract are quite significant (notwithstanding some differences
that derive mostly from property’s in rem character).152 Property law increasingly
recognizes — as it should, in a liberal polity — the possibility of contracting
around property rules.153 But this trend does not negate the significance of law’s
facilitation of property types. When, for example, property law entrenched
common-interest-communities as a property type, it saved on the transaction
costs involved in tailoring this type from scratch and, even more significantly,
added a salient option to the housing market. Common-interest-communities
vary widely and thus require further refinement, but this is not to deny the
empowering effect of adding this type to our property inventory.
The exact same reasoning applies to the relationship between contract
types and the possible project descriptions, sets of goals, and sets of actions
of specific parties who resort to a given contract type. Choice theory requires
that, for every sphere of contracting, law should provide a variety of sufficiently
distinctive contract types — a bounded variety, not an infinite mishmash
as Markovits and Schwartz would have it. For this bounded variety to be
autonomy-enhancing, as choice theory prescribes, these types need to be
partial functional substitutes for each other: “They need to be substitutes
because choice is not enhanced with alternatives that are orthogonal to each
other; and their substitutability should not be too complete because types that
are too similar also do not offer meaningful choice.”154
This understanding of types implies an important, even if imprecise,
distinction between different types and different terms. It also clarifies that
choice theory does not expect legal institutions to tailor precise scripts for
every contract dyad; its autonomy-enhancing telos does not, in other words,
necessitate the degree of granularity ascribed to it by Markovits and Schwartz.
152 One seemingly categorical difference derives from property’s numerus clausus.
But even strict adherence to this principle does not practically undermine parties’
choice; moreover, we think a liberal property system must follow the rule in
Spain (among other countries) that recognizes — alongside the state-supported
property types — the option of “tailor-made” property rights. See Thomas W.
Merrill & Henry Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: the
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 35-38 (2000); Dagan, supra note
72, at ch. 4.
153 This trend is manifested most significantly in the traditionally immutable areas
of marital property and servitudes. See Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations ch. 7 (2002); Restatement
(Third) of Servitudes §§2.1, 2.4, 2.6, 3.2 (2000).
154 Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 106-07.
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Rather, for contract law to perform its autonomy-enhancing work, it is enough
for it to construct a repertoire of contract types, each suited to a paradigmatic
category of projects, a typical set of goals, and a corresponding typical set of
actions, which can be thus structured around a distinct (and robust) animating
principle. In other words, much like the property types that law offers, its
contract types also perform a role of in rem intelligibility.155
There is no reason to assume that the number of such categories of contract
types is dramatically different from the number of property types. Either
way, our claim does not rely on answering that question. We make a more
limited observation: in the commercial sphere, contracting parties seem to
like having choice; and when they find their choices insufficient, they seem
able to catalyze new types and manage the resulting multiplicity. Private
actors and legal institutions have created a robust repertoire of commercial
contract types. If they are up to this task in the commercial sphere, perhaps
they are equally so in other contracting spheres too.
Markovits and Schwartz maintain that choice theory would be reluctant to
“simplify its type creation task by limiting types to reasonable or appropriately
balanced value judgments; for to do that is to impose an evaluative frame,”
because such limits would undermine its commitment to pluralism.156 But choice
theory is not neutral when it comes to contract types that involve relational
injustice (as we clarified in Section II.A157). Let us return to the employment
contract dilemma that Markovits and Schwartz raised. If the conflict involves
a type that complies with relational justice (by proscribing discrimination)
and one that authorizes relational injustice (by allowing contract practices that
undermine contract’s own telos of reciprocal respect to self-determination),
then choice theory would not hesitate to opt for the former.
We do not deny, of course, that this “floor” of relational justice would
still leave a huge set of options, which means that only a fraction of potential
alternatives could become actual contract types. That’s fine. Relational justice
excludes bad types. For the rest, judgment should be guided not by normative
evaluation, but by commitment to ensuring partial functional equivalents and
by attention to pragmatic considerations, relating notably to what Klass dubs
“the mechanics of choice.”158
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158

We thank Daniel Markovits for this formulation of our claim.
Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 586.
See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
Klass, supra note 2.
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Choice Theory’s discussion of these matters is admittedly preliminary,
partly because it requires social scientific skills that we lack.159 But this task is
not unachievable: it neither implicates overly-perfectionist value judgments,
nor does it require unbounded multiplicity of contract types.
These responses to Markovits and Schwartz’s implementation challenge also
help clarify how, specifically, choice theory is pluralist (and how it isn’t). And
they begin to explain how our reliance on “autonomy as self-determination”
brings structure to contract’s seemingly conflicting values. Let us now make
the lessons here more explicit.
Markovits and Schwartz believe there is a deep, indeed irreconcilable,
tension between choice theory’s commitment to autonomy and its embrace
of pluralism. For them, this tension pushes choice theory to employ an
uninformative conception of autonomy. In this reading, a seemingly-charitable
interpretation of choice theory would understand autonomy not as contract’s
“master value,”160 but rather as merely “one value among many.”161
We agree that an account of contract that relied on such foundational value
pluralism would be vulnerable to the critique of indeterminacy and it may
end up failing in its aspiration for guidance or evaluation. But choice theory
is categorically not foundationally pluralist.162 This may be hard to explain,
but it is central to our argument.
As we tried to clarify in Chapters 5 and 6 of Choice Theory, the theory’s
normative pluralism is limited to the goods of contracts — utility and community.
This domain of normative pluralism is circumscribed due to our understanding
of utility and community as instrumental and intrinsic values, respectively.
But, in turn, they are subordinate to autonomy, contract’s ultimate value.
Choice theory is not pluralist all the way up.
Because utility and community typify the goods people seek when resorting
to contracts, accommodating them under autonomy’s ultimate rule allows
choice theory to avoid the pitfalls of capitulation that are indeed endemic to
accounts — such as those of Markovits and of Schwartz — that situate utility
or community at the core of their theories. Our approach also avoids the
capitulation costs of previous autonomy-based accounts that fail to appreciate
159 Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 106-07. We do not imply that the work of
social science here should, or can, supplant legal theory, but rather that the
former is a necessary input for the further development of the latter.
160 Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 587.
161 Id., at 582.
162 For the distinction between foundational pluralism and autonomy-based pluralism,
see Hanoch Dagan, Reconstructing American Legal Realism & Rethinking
Private Law Theory 171-73 (2013).
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the significance of multiplicity to autonomy.163 Choice theory embraces the
complexity of contract practice, but rejects foundational value pluralism.
Choice theory is insistently agnostic regarding the various combinations
of “dosages” of community and utility that a society chooses in its contract
types — so long as they are above the relational justice floor, so long as there
are enough partial functional substitutes, and so long as the range of types
attends to the mechanics of choice (as we clarified in Part I of this Article). At
the same time, choice theory is adamantly opinionated in its commitment to the
parties’ autonomy. Thus, it actively rejects attempts to use contract for — let
alone claims that contract law should actively facilitate — practices that are
autonomy-reducing. Because reciprocal respect to self-determination is the
foundation of contract law’s legitimacy, its implications for contract law design
are not optional. In other words, while choice theory embraces the plurality of
contract types, its value pluralism is emphatically not foundational, but rather
autonomy-based. And Markovits and Schwartz’s skepticism notwithstanding,
we argue that this combination — foundational autonomy with pluralist types
— does generate sufficiently determinate prescriptions to make it a theory
properly-so-called.
We admittedly addressed only some of these points in Choice Theory, but
have added a few more in Part II of this Article. There is much more to be
said. Happily, much of this unfinished business converges with our debt to
Benson’s critique. As may be recalled, we still need to respond to Benson’s
second complaint — regarding choice theory’s fit with the existing Contract
Canon. Benson is correct in claiming that an important dimension in assessing
a theory of contract law is the degree to which it actually accounts for existing
doctrine. Sharpening the prescriptions of choice theory’s autonomy-based
foundation allows us to demonstrate choice theory’s explanatory power — and
simultaneously put to rest Markovits and Schwartz’s concerns about the vices
of our “embracing” approach. This is the task of the last section of this Article.
C. The Contract Canon
We hoped, in Choice Theory, to highlight the underappreciated potential
contribution of contract types to our autonomy, and to push theorists and
policymakers to consider expanding the inventory of contract types for work,
home, and intimacy. In focusing on this goal — and with the aim of writing a
short book — we indeed paid too little attention to demonstrating the broader
implications of choice theory to contract law. We emphasized the hitherto
163 This may explain, of course, Fried’s embrace of choice theory, discussed in Part
I.A.
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marginalized significance of the intra-sphere multiplicity of contract types by
celebrating contract law’s reliance on private law’s foundational prescription of
reciprocal respect to self-determination. But, in addition to this lesson, choice
theory also fits and elucidates the fabric of the existing canon of contract law.
In other words, choice theory better explains the most salient rules, doctrines,
and cases that currently predominate in contracts casebooks and scholarship.
Reconstructing the contract canon in the mold of choice theory is an
important and formidable task that we will be undertaking in the future.164 For
our current purposes, a quick roadmap should (hopefully) suffice. Section
II.A of this Article previews such an exercise. Choice theory implies, we
have argued, that contract law in a liberal society must follow three guiding
principles:
(1) Law should proactively facilitate contracts.
(2) Law should take seriously the autonomy of the parties’ future selves.
(3) Relational justice must serve as the floor of legitimate contractual
interactions eligible for law’s support.
While we discussed each of these principles in Choice Theory, we realize
now that we did so in an ad hoc manner, with the building blocks scattered
through Part III of the book. There is more to say on their interrelationships,
particularly in the context of the existing Contract Canon. A broad set of
existing contract rules respond well to, and are in fact entailed by, these three
principles; indeed, we claim they play a key role in the legal constitution of
contract from inception to breakdown.
Core rules that govern the life of contracts all share the same autonomyenhancing mission and thus necessarily follow the principles it entails. Such
rules include those that regulate the bargaining process and formation of
contracts; determine the parties’ obligations by identifying and interpreting
their agreement, filling gaps, and setting norms for performance and excuse;
and finally define the consequences of breach by prescribing the type and scope
of available remedies. It is impossible to discuss properly this vast terrain
in the little space left for this Article. So here is a snapshot, taking the three
principles in turn (and reserving detailed case citation and analysis till later).

164 Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, Choice Theory and the Canon of Contract
Law (work in progress on file with authors).
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1. Proactive Facilitation165
The objective theory of contract is a good first example of the principle of
proactive facilitation. While many theories of contract (including Benson’s)
support the objective approach, choice theory provides a particularly secure
justification for its role in modern contract law. Indeed, we believe the
contemporary status of the objective theory is best explained by the qualitative
difference between the rather limited autonomy-enhancing potential of a
subjective theory of contract and the far more impressive potential of its
objective counterpart. We think this explanation can also helpfully re-frame
and clarify some of the most contentious issues of contract doctrine dealing
with the parol evidence rule and with contract interpretation, by highlighting
the empowering potential of the predictability generated by delimiting the
range of admissible evidence and focusing on the literal meaning of the
parties’ agreement.
Taking seriously contract’s autonomy-enhancing telos not only justifies
the widespread endorsement of the objective theory,166 but also justifies and
explains further doctrinal features of contract law. First, consider incomplete
agreements. While the traditional common law was hesitant to enforce
incomplete agreements, modern law takes a diametrically-opposite attitude.167
Contemporary contract law is no longer satisfied with providing enforcement
services to parties who fully specify the terms of their engagement. Certainly,
where the parties “intentionally and deliberately” do not “incorporate in their
agreements readily available, verifiable measures of performance,” courts
correctly infer that they do not intend legal enforcement.168 But beyond
this category, current law — both the Uniform Commercial Code and the

165 For a more extended treatment of this principle and how it defies contract theories
that rely on competing understandings of freedom, see Hanoch Dagan, Types of
Contracts and Law’s Autonomy-Enhancing Role, 5 Eur. Contract L. & Theory
(forthcoming 2020).
166 Recall, however, that taking the objective theory to the extreme might override
autonomy by overriding voluntariness, which underscores the role not only of
doctrines such as duress and misrepresentation, but also those such as entry
rules, as discussed in Section II.B. It also implies a cautious attitude towards
memoranda of agreements. Such an attitude properly typifies American contract
law, but — unfortunately — not Israeli contract law. Compare Coley v. Lang,
339 So. 2d 70 (1976) with C.A. 158/77 Rabinai v. Man-Shaked Ltd., 33 (2) Sup.
Ct. 281.
167 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 120-21 (4th ed. 2004).
168 Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 Colum.
L. Rev. 1641, 1657, 1659 (2003).

2019]

Freedom, Choice, and Contracts

631

Restatement (Second) of Contracts169 — goes out of its way to facilitate
transactions by offering defaults that can fill gaps, even regarding crucial
aspects of a transaction, such as price.170 A significant subset of the current
contract law canon belongs to this category.
Positioning gap-filling as a core function of contract law quickly necessitates
a significant degree of variation among contract types. In other words, expanding
the facilitative ambition of contract law requires it to adjust the means with
which it can identify mutually-beneficial interactions worthy of its support
as well as the rules that can best support them. This devotion to contract’s
autonomy-enhancement telos can explain and justify the development of
promissory estoppel and of the material benefit rule as contracts’ additional
gatekeeping doctrines, alongside the traditional consideration doctrine. It
likewise accounts for the gradual recognition that other rules that are, at
times, presented as part of contract law’s signature core — for instance, the
mirror-image rule for offer and acceptance, the standard of performance of
perfect tender, the promisor’s strict liability, or the dominance of expectation
damages — all, in fact, prevail in only certain contract types, and not in others.
The step we have emphasized most in Choice Theory — ensuring sufficient
contract types and securing intra-sphere multiplicity — is indeed a necessary
feature of a liberal contract law that takes seriously its commitment to proactively
facilitate contract’s autonomy-enhancing potential. While we identified an
important reformist agenda in the book, we should also highlight here the
substantial steps contract law has already taken to implement choice theory.
Think, for example, of the contract-type innovations — exclusive dealings,
outputs, and requirement contracts — that harmoniously follow choice theory’s
prescription of intra-sphere multiplicity and are now part of the canon.171
2. Autonomy of the Future Self
Bolstering the facilitative effect of contract law in these ways makes the second
principle noted above — dealing with the need to consider the autonomy of
the parties’ future selves — particularly significant. But its normative power
need not rely on this additional urgency. Rather, it derives immediately
from contract’s autonomy-enhancing telos: a law that confers upon people
169 See U.C.C. § 2-204(3); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33 (1981).
170 See U.C.C. § 2-305.
171 See U.C.C. § 2-306. As the text (and Choice Theory) suggests, pace Benson’s
claim (Benson, supra note 2, at 567-70), judges’ situation sense, their development
of modes of currency, and their recognition of legal formalities cannot plausibly
suffice for properly facilitating transaction types. Existing law therefore goes
well beyond these modest means.
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the normative power to commit themselves through contract in the name of
enhancing their self-determination cannot ignore the impact of such contracts
on their future selves. Self-authorship, after all, stands for our right to write
and re-write the story of our life. Appreciating this tension, which is inherent
in contract’s raison d’être (any act of self-authorship constrains the future
self), implies that contract law needs to be particularly careful in defining the
scope of the obligations it enforces and in circumscribing their implications.
The main doctrinal manifestations of this principle can be divided into four
sets of rules. The first set — the rules dealing with mutual mistake and with
impossibility, impracticability, and frustration172 — is straightforward. These
doctrines delimit the parties’ obligations by reference to their shared basic
assumptions with regard to facts, or to the occurrence of a future contingency
material to their agreement.173 Risks that fall outside this domain and are not
allocated to the adversely-affected party should not encumber his or her future
self. Applying this rule may be difficult, and its details vary across contract
types, but its autonomy-enhancing rationale is straightforward: there is no
“autonomy gain” in enforcing contracts that go beyond the parties’ own basic
assumptions.
Second, and on the other side of the spectrum, in Choice Theory we observed
a set of rules that prescribe the outer limits of people’s power to commit, such
as restrictions on the enforceability of employee non-compete agreements,
limits on the advance sale of future wages, and the semi-inalienability of the
unilateral right of termination of long-term contracts. In many of these cases,
the parties’ intention to commit is clear. But even when such rules apply, an
autonomy-enhancing contract law must be careful not to undermine people’s
mobility in a way that ends up being detrimental to their self-determination.
In other words, a liberal contract law must acknowledge the possibility of
regret, which these rules indeed enshrine, not only as a response to rationality
deficiencies or market failures, but also as an inherent entailment of our most
fundamental commitment to people’s right to (re)invent themselves.174
Third, consider remedies. These rules are guided by an effort to minimize
the future autonomy-constraining effects of a present autonomy-enhancing
commitment. Many limitations on remedies for breach of contract comfortably
belong to this category. The most salient rule here deals with the severe
172 This paragraph provides a preliminary response to Markovits and Schwartz’s
reference to the excuse rule (Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 582) as
an example of a contract doctrine that may seem unrelated to choice theory and
thus unaffected by its prescriptions.
173 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152-52 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-615.
174 For more on this point, see Dagan & Heller, Ultimate Value, supra note 4.
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limitations on specific performance (and its cognates) in the common law
tradition. Other things being equal (for the promisee), a liberal contract law
rightly refuses to compel the promisor to act in accordance with the contractual
script, allowing her to choose between doing so and covering the promisee’s
expectation. This traditional and strong preference for monetary recovery
is thus not, as mistakenly presented by some critics, an embarrassment to
contract law, but rather a salutary testament to contract law’s underlying
liberal commitments.175
Finally, situating the parties’ self-determination at the core of contract’s
normative infrastructure beautifully accounts for the subtle, yet at times
significant, difference between the pertinent rules of contract types that implicate
people’s self-identity and those that are only about material concerns. The
prime example here again comes from the law of specific performance typified
by a rigid resistance against awarding such a remedy in service contracts.176
The same sensitivity to the difference between “me” and “mine” explains, and
indeed justifies, the inapplicability of any reasonableness inquiry regarding
refusals to accept a different or inferior position in mitigation of breach of a
personal service contract.177
3. Relational Justice178
The final guiding principle begins with choice theory’s proposition, noted
repeatedly in these pages, in which the legitimacy of enforcing contracts —
even wholly executory contracts — necessarily relies on the most fundamental
foundation of a liberal private law of reciprocal respect for self-determination,
which includes (modest) affirmative interpersonal obligations. Once we
appreciate that reciprocal respect for self-determination is the premise of
contract’s own legitimacy, it becomes evident that any attempt to recruit the
law in the service of an agreement that defies this premise must be treated as
ultra vires: an abuse of the idea of contract—that is, the use of contract law
for a purpose that contravenes its telos.179
For more on this point, see Dagan & Heller, Autonomy, Refined, supra note 4.
See Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 367(1) (1981).
See Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 474 P.2d 689 (1970).
For a more extended treatment of this principle, see Hanoch Dagan, The Value of
Choice and the Justice of Contract, Jurisprudence (forthcoming 2019); Hanoch
Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Justice for Contracts (unpublished manuscript, on
file with authors).
179 We again find ourselves here in agreement with Benson’s “Rawlsian” proposition
that “at every step in the argument contract law must specify principles and rules
that reflect the requirements of the reasonable and so can legitimately constrain
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There is, again, a wide array of doctrinal rules that secure contract law’s
integrity by guaranteeing its compliance with this prescription of relational
justice. Some of these rules are products of adjudication; others were enacted
by legislatures and regulatory agencies, oftentimes after the common law set
a vague standard that legislators and regulators are better suited to delimit. We
can identify four sets of contract rules that robustly vindicate contract law’s
requirement of relational justice as the “admission criterion” for recruiting
its support.
Consider first those rules that regulate the parties’ bargaining process in
a way that goes beyond the traditional laissez faire mode of proscribing the
active interference of one party with the other’s free will. This set of rules
expands the range of vitiating factors by prescribing affirmative interpersonal
obligations. It thus accounts for the expansion of the law of fraud beyond
the traditional categories of misrepresentation and concealment to include
also — notably in real estate and securities transactions — disclosure duties.
This conceptual expansion also underlies the doctrine of unilateral mistake.
Similar analysis may help explain duress cases of wrongful threats that do
not violate others’ rights as well as anti-price-gouging laws and admiralty
rules of salvage. Finally, a charitable reading of unconscionability doctrine
and some of its regulatory cognates sits comfortably within a regime that is
careful to ensure that contract is used only in settings that comply with the
minimal requirements of reciprocal respect to self-determination.
A parallel set of quite diverse rules includes moderate duties to ensure that
the parties assist in promoting each other’s self-determination. Together, these
rules solidify a cooperative conception of contract performance. The duty of
good faith and fair dealing, which sets up the contractual rules of the game,
stands at the doctrinal core of this conception. The substantial performance
doctrine in service contracts and the principle against forfeiture in applying
the condition/promise distinction, as well as the burden to mitigate and the
choice of the expectation interest as the default measure of recovery, can all,
likewise, be interpreted as belonging to this cooperative framework.
The last two sets of doctrines that vindicate contract law’s compliance with
relational justice are not part of the conventional canon of contract law, but
are increasingly part of the actual life of contract. Highlighting the continuity
between these doctrines and the more canonical manifestations of relational
justice in contract law noted above can thus help demonstrate the prevalence
of relational justice in existing doctrine.

parties through the coercive enforcement of legal duties and rights.” Benson,
supra note 2, at 570.
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One set mandates the minimal level of interpersonal decency contract
law is willing to accept vis-à-vis contract types that significantly affect the
personhood of one of the parties — regarding, for example, minimum wages,
safety in the workplace, or the habitability of homes. Relational justice is the
most plausible foundation for this group of immutable contract rules, which
are, by now, entrenched, yet the grounds for which remain debated as a matter
of contract theory. The other set concerns duties to respect the contractual party
as the person she actually is, and thus accommodate her constitutive features
such as race, gender, language, nationality, religion, disability, familial status,
and sexual orientation. At times, these duties are relevant to the content of
the parties’ obligations. More often, however, they serve as “gatekeepers”
to ensure that parties who make systemic use of contract — by becoming
employers, landlords, or owners of public accommodations — do not apply
discriminatory practices in their choice of contractual counterparts and thus
contravene the requirement of reciprocal respect to self-determination on
which contract is founded.

Concluding Remarks
Choice Theory advances a claim about the centrality of freedom to contract.
In that book, we situate efficiency-based and community-based accounts
of contract as building blocks of an autonomy-enhancing contract law. We
argue that a liberal and general theory requires the state to proactively ensure
availability of a diverse range of normatively-attractive contract types in
the key spheres of contract: commerce, work, home, and intimacy. This is a
provocative position. Does it hold up?
Our goal with Choice Theory was, in part, to trigger debate among the
world’s leading contract scholars regarding contract’s role in securing freedom
and facilitating choice — and to move thinking forward on fundamental
questions in the field. Does contract serve freedom and choice, and if so,
how? Who should make the choices that contract law facilitates, and how
should they do so? And what is the proper relationship between contract law
and contract types?
Each Article in this Issue advances the field. Reflecting on them has helped
us to adjust, clarify, and refine choice theory. On balance, choice theory holds
up well. It comes out stronger and, to our minds, more persuasive. But there is
much more work to be done. Together, we continue on a mutual path toward
a more just and justified law of contract.

